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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
nished by a duly authorized surety company. Article 107,24 pro-
viding for forfeiture and collection of bonds for appearances be-
fore city or juvenile courts or for preliminary examinations, is
modified to eliminate the recordation requirement when the
bondsman is a surety company.
In 195825 the nonforfeiture situations set forth in Article 109
were amended to embrace cases where the defendant was pre-
vented from appearing because he was detained in jail or a peni-
tentiary in another jurisdiction, or because he was in the Armed
Services. Article 109 is further amended by Act 411 to provide
for setting aside a judgment of forfeiture within sixty days on
proof that the defendant's non-appearance resulted from the
types of detention recognized in that article.
Article 11026 is amended to authorize the discharge of a judg-
ment of forfeiture if the defendant is surrendered, in prison or
in open court, within sixty days after the rendition of the judg-
ment. Discharge of the judgment of forfeiture upon subsequent
surrender of the defendant is a justifiable relaxation of the lia-
bility imposed on the surety, but the surety should bear the costs
incurred in the forfeiture proceedings. This is not specified in
the amendment, but such assessment of costs should be within
the court's general authority in setting aside the judgment.
PUBLIC LAW
Melvin G. Dackin*
STATE REGULATION OF BUSINESS - THE NEW "MILK AUDIT" LAW
The last legislative session took another long step towards
complete regulation of the fluid milk and ice cream and ice cream
substitutes industry. The Orderly Milk Marketing Act, which
was enacted in 1958 to provide minimum prices to producers and
to proscribe sales below cost and other "disruptive sales prac-
tices,"' was amended in 1962 to provide for the fixing of mini-
mum and maximum prices at which "milk, milk products and
24. Id. 15:107.
25. Id. 15:109 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 191.
26. LA. R.S. 15:110 (Supp. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 40:940.1-940.15 (Supp. 1958).
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frozen desserts" are to be sold by handlers, distributors, and non-
processing retailers to any person ;2 the act thus ushers in a
period of consumer price-fixing in the dairy industry of Lou-
isiana.
The 1958 act was upheld as a proper exercise of the police
power, the Louisiana Supreme Court not being disturbed by its
characterization as a price-fixing statute ;3 the court noted that
the United States Supreme Court has stated that "upon proper
occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a
business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged
for the products or commodities it sells."'4
Orderly milk marketing acts have been a part of the agricul-
tural scene since the early 1930's ;5 they have grown progressive-
ly more complex and sophisticated, keeping pace with the grow-
ing concentration of economic power in the industry and the mul-
tiplying array of economic and technological devices available
for waging intensive competition. Alignment of economic forces
in the industry was evidenced by the way in which constitution-
ality of the 1958 act was precipitated. Thus, the State Commis-
sioner of Agriculture was initially enjoined from enforcing the
act by a federal district court at the suit of one of the nation's
largest manufacturers, processors, and distributors.' Another
such federal injunction was granted, pending determination of
the constitutionality of the act in the state courts, at the suit of
a large local supermarket.8 The Commissioner was joined in his
defense of the act by twenty-one local producers and processors
of milk in the state.9
The 1958 act was sustained not only as to its producer price-
fixing aspects but also in its licensing requirements and in its
proscription of a long list of "disruptive trade practices." Among
such trade practices were discrimination by larger distributors
between large and small retailers in the price of products offered
2. LA. R.S. 40:940.1-940.23, 940.19 (Supp. 1962).
3. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So.2d
606, 617 (1959).
4. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533, 570 (1939).
5. Cadwallader, Government and Its Relationship to Price Standards in the
Milk Industry, 22 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1938).
6. Hutt, Restrictions on the Free Movement of Fluid Milk under Federal Milk
Marketing Orders, 37 U. oF DETROIT L.J. 525 (1960).
7. Borden Co. v. McCrory, 169 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1959).
8. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkt. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d
606 (1959).
9. Id. at 773, 112 So. 2d at 607.
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in the same size containers and discrimination in price, for the
purpose of injuring selected competitors in different parts of
the state. 10 In proscribing these practices, the first type of dis-
crimination was no doubt thought by the legislature to encour-
age distribution in the supermarkets at the expense of route dis-
tribution and smaller markets; the second discrimination was
found to be a weapon in so-called "milk wars," the participants
in which were often a major national or state processor-distrib-
utor and a local processor-distributor." Additional sanction
against such practices was supplied by provisions that no sales
should be below cost, as prescribed by the Commissioner pur-
suant to procedures provided in the act.'
2
Basically, all of this regulation was deemed necessary in
order to assure the local producer a minimum price which would
be "beneficial to the public interest, protect the dairy industry
of the state, and insure a sufficient quantity of pure and whole-
some milk for inhabitants of this state." It was evidently
thought that only if local producers could be protected from
large competitors who discounted heavily or even resorted to
sales below cost for a time, in order to get into a market and
crowd others out of it, could satisfactory minimum prices to local
producers be assured.13 The large national operators argued that
this was an attempt to protect "small dairies which cannot com-
pete with twentieth century methods of production and distribu-
tion." They argued that "the so-called disruptive trade practices
.. are actually beneficial to the industry as a whole, particular-
ly to the consuming public, that they are normal, usual and cus-
tomary methods of operation practiced in the industry for years,
that the purpose and effect ... is to multiply the number of re-
tailers who can offer milk products for sale under wholesome
conditions at a competitive price, that unless these small retail-
ers are assisted by these 'disruptive practices' . . . [they] will be
unable to compete with the large supermarkets which do not re-
quire assistance from milk producers in the form of credit ex-
tension, cooling equipment and advertising display.' 4 In some
degree, the large operators thus maintained a position which
split the small, non-processing retailer away from the small pro-
ducers, in respect to economic interest; the large supermarket
10. Id. at 782, 112 So. 2d at 611.
11. LA. R.S. 40:940.3(1), 940.6 (Supp. 1958).
12. Id. 40:940.5, 940.7.
13. Act 193 of 1958, Preamble, LA. R.S. 40, Part VII, Sub-Part D.
14. 169 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. La. 1959).
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presumably needed only its quantity discounts to enable it to
maintain its competitive position.
In the years since enactment of Act 193 of 1958 no litigation
appears to have reached the appellate courts which drew in ques-
tion action of the Commissioner under his power to fix minimum
prices to be paid producers, a power to be exercised upon writ-
ten request of 50 per cent of the dairy farmers who "regularly
supply milk to a milk marketing area."'15 The Commissioner's
action under the 1958 statute in fixing the cost to processors and
handlers as a minimum resale price has, however, precipitated
litigation, and is in part responsible for this year's new legisla-
tion. A formula was promulgated by the Commissioner, pur-
suant to which such cost would be "the average cost to the proc-
essor during the previous twelve months." The Commissioner's
regulation further provided that a processor or handler who had
been doing business for less than twelve months should be
deemed to have a cost not less than the lowest "price" within his
trade area. 16
Two circuit courts of appeal have held that in setting "trade
area price" as "cost" for new processors and handlers, the Com-
missioner exceeded his powers over litigant processors who
claimed their actual costs were lower than such prices and that,
since they were, the act did not preclude them from selling at
such cost.' 7 To compel such new producers to sell at the average
twelve-month costs of others in the area was found to be engag-
ing in "price fixing" rather than proscribing sales below cost,
as the Commissioner was authorized to do by the act' 8
The Commissioner argued quite plausibly that he could not
administer the act to preclude sales below cost "unless he is given
the power to regulate the prices of new businesses"; presumably
this inability stemmed from lack of reasonably reliable cost fig-
ures for small dairy businesses for periods of less than a year.
One appellate judge suggested that the regulation might have
been redrafted to presume cost to be the "trade area price" until
"by adequate showing before the Commissioner another unit cost
is proven."' 9
15. LA. R.S. 40:940.4 (Supp. 1958).
16. La. Orderly Milk Marketing Reg., Oct. 18, 1958, § VII.
17. Smith Milk Co. v. Pearce, 129 So. 2d 525 (La. App. lst Cir. 1961) ; Pearce
v. Kramer, 128 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
18. 129 So. 2d at 529.
19. 128 So. 2d at 309.
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For whatever reasons, such suggested procedures were evi-
dently not deemed sufficient to deal with the developing prob-
lems and Act 340 of 1962 emerged as a full-dress price-fixing
measure; a new seven-man Milk Commission has been created
and charged with the task of fixing the minimum and possibly
maximum prices at which milk, milk products and frozen des-
serts may be sold "to any person. ' 20 Evidently, the legislature
was not persuaded that free competition should be permanently
abandoned, however, since it also provided that "this Commis-
sion and the law creating same shall expire on July 31, 1966."21
Act 193 of 1958 had delegated to the Commissioner of Agri-
culture the power to fix minimum producer prices upon request
from producers; in the Schwegmann case, this was upheld as a
valid delegation, the Louisiana Supreme Court noting that if the
legislature declares the policy of the law and fixes the "legal
principles which are to control," the administrative body may be
invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to
which the policy and principles apply.22 Since the legislature has
incorporated in Act 340 of 1962 in even greater detail the factors
to be taken into account by the new Commission in fixing prices,
it seems clear the new delegation of power will also be upheld.
The composition of the Commission seems hardly subject to due
process attack since, in addition to the Commissioner, there will
be three other "representatives of the public at large"; thus, any
disqualifying bias in the three industry members seems satis-
factorily offset.23
The new Commission is charged with fixing consumer mini-
mum prices and may fix maximum prices for milk, milk prod-
ucts, and frozen desserts. The power to fix minimum prices paid
to the producer is left with the Commissioner as before. The
factors to be considered in fixing the consumer price consequent-
ly break down into: (1) the minimum producer price prevailing
in the market area (or ingredient cost for ice cream substitutes),
(2) the normal and necessary operating expenses of the handler,
distributor, or non-processing retailer, (3) presumably, such ad-
ditional sum, as return on capital, as will "best assure sufficient
quantities of pure and wholesome milk, milk products, and frozen
20. LA. R.S. 40:940.16, 940.19(4) (Supp. 1962).
21. LA. R.S. 40:940.16 (Supp. 1962).
22. 237 La. 768, 788, 112 So. 2d 606, 613 (1959).
23. Cf. Plantation Anhydrous Ammonia Corp. v. Anhydrous Ammonia Comm.,
234 La. 869, 101 So. 2d 699 (1958). Commented on in 19 LA. L. REV. 351, 362
(1959).
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desserts to the citizens of the State. ' 24 The latter item of return
on capital is more elaborately described for fixing minimum
prices to producers, the Commissioner being charged with fixing
minimums in any milk marketing area within the state which
"shall be beneficial to the public interest, protect the dairy in-
dustry of the state, and insure a sufficient quantity of pure and
wholesome milk for inhabitants of this state.
25
Guided by these factors, the Commission is given the complex
task of setting minimum prices for milk, milk products, and
frozen desserts. Frozen desserts are included to stop up a loop-
hole which might otherwise defeat the minimum price on milk;
combinations of milk and ice cream could otherwise be offered,
so arranged price-wise as to undercut minimum prices on milk
through underpricing a tied-in sale of ice cream.
The Commission may establish minimum selling prices for
non-processing retailers that differ from the minimums for per-
sons making home deliveries. There is no mention, however, of
setting minimum prices for the supermarket quantity seller dif-
ferent from those of the small convenience stores.2 6 On the other
hand, discounts which handlers and distributors are permitted
to make from minimum selling price are to take into account
quantities of the products purchased, such discounts to be "based
upon a graduated scale of discounts proportionate to quantities
delivered during such period of time ... as the commission may
deem appropriate." Such discount schedules may not reflect the
total quantities delivered to a multiple store owner; each place
of business must stand on its own bottom as to its discount en-
titlement.2 7 But even with the discount to a multiple store owner
so limited, it is obvious that a large supermarket would enjoy
some substantial quantity discount over the convenience stores;
presently, some part of these quantity savings are also normally
passed on to consumers since they are presumably crucial to the
lower prices which bring in the customers in large numbers and
in turn make the quantity purchases possible. But if no differ-
ential in selling price is permitted between the small convenience
store and the quantity retail seller, and the minimum is set high
enough to yield a profit to the convenience seller, it is also ob-
vious that quantity sellers will be forced to pocket quantity sav-
24. LA. R.S. 40:940.20(1) (Supp. 1962).
25. Id. 40:940.4.
26. Id. 40:940.19(7).
27. Id. 40:940.19(9).
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ings on milk or pass them on in lower prices on other commodi-
ties. The act precludes them from passing on such savings in
combination sales with frozen desserts since these must be sold
at 8 percent above wholesale price, for which latter minimums
are also to be fixed by the Commission ;28 other modes of pass-
ing on the savings are, however, not foreclosed to the retailer.
The small handlers and distributors are to be protected from
being crowded out by the large operators by determining the
quantity discounts to which a retailer is entitled, not from the
quantity delivered by any one handler or distributor, but from
the total quantity taken from all sellers. Thus, minimum whole-
sale prices which will necessarily be set high enough to keep the
small handlers and distributors in business, must also be charged
by the large handler or distributor for his larger quantities; he
cannot increase his share of sales by passing on his quantity sav-
ings to the retailer. 29 Presumably, this will result in some ami-
cable apportionment of markets between the small and large han-
dlers and distributors. This, the statute states, will "assure the
availability of a sufficient variety of brands to consumers in
those retail stores having sufficient display space and ... avoid
injury to small independent handlers and distributors. '8 0
In the experimental years to come, we shall no doubt learn
whether the Commission and the Commissioner can serve the
public interest in the allocation of resources to milk production
and distribution better than free competition has done the job.
We shall learn whether they are permitted to strike a pricing
.balance which will protect only the efficient and imaginative
producers and distributors or whether they will feel compelled
to protect also the marginal operators at the expense of the con-
sumer and the public interest.
Recent studies have tended to show that state control of con-
sumer prices has acted as a trade barrier, preventing or slowing
down the use of new dairy technologies and new methods that
competitive markets have adopted.3 1 However, local markets,
protected from competition between fluid milk producers and
distributors also become targets for substituted competition such
as that from the new sterile concentrated milk in tins, recently
28. Id. 40:940.19(5).
29. Id. 40:940.19(9).
30. Ibid.
31. "Trade Barriers in Milk Distribution," Dept. of Agr. Econ., Univ. of Illi-
nois, 35 (1960).
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developed. If, as has been suggested, this new tinned milk may
be genuinely competitive with fresh milk, the price-fixing ap-
paratus will have to be extended, or the new competitor kept out
by artificially high sanitary requirements.
3 2
Serious questions may be raised whether, if concentrated
milk becomes available on a continuing and reliable basis from
producing areas far removed from urban markets, there will
continue to be justification for elaborate control mechanisms
"designed solely to protect, encourage, or handle local seasonal
surplus in areas that would otherwise be characterized as milk
deficient."3 3 Questions are also being raised as to whether the
benefits of improved dairy technology, the fruits of intensive re-
search often carried on at public expense, may not be denied to
producers and consumers by regulation which may be designed
to "protect established market relationships rather than the
public's health.
34
INSURANCE
G. Frank Purvis, Jr.*
The 1962 legislature covered a wide variety of insurance sub-
jects although the enactments in this field of law were relatively
few.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS
(a) Initial Minimum Surplus
Previous legislatures had increased the capital and surplus
required for the organization and operation of certain types of
insurers and the 1962 legislature followed this up by making
similar requirements of mutual and reciprocal insurers. Act 49
amended Section 121 of the Insurance Code to increase the initial
minimum surplus required of domestic mutual insurers trans-
acting life insurance only, health and accident insurance only, or
a combination of these, from $150,000 to $200,000. Act 50
32. Ibid. Concentrated milk sold in hermetically sealed containers is presently
exempted from the Louisiana act. LA. R.S. 40:940.1(1) (Supp. 1962).
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 12.
*Executive Vice President, Pan-American Life Insurance Company; member,
Louisiana Bar.
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